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ASSESSING THE CHANGING HUMAN PERFORMANCE RISK  
PROFILE IN THE NEXTGEN MID-TERM 
 
Katherine A. Berry & Michael W. Sawyer 
Fort Hill Group 
Washington, DC 
 
Many Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) Operational Improvements 
(OIs) aim to provide controllers with decision support tools and other automation 
specifically designed to provide safety enhancements to National Airspace System (NAS) 
operations. While these changes may indeed produce positive safety improvements, the 
introduction of each new system and capability also offers the possibility of introducing 
new human performance hazards into the NAS. A thorough review of the proposed 
NextGen midterm OIs was completed to identify the potential for both the positive and 
negative impacts on the human contribution to risk in the NAS. A summary of these 
findings was presented by linking the proactive human performance assessment with the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) top five hazards in the NAS for fiscal year 
2013. The results showed that while some of the human performance hazards present in 
current operations were reduced or eliminated, many new human performance hazards 
could also be introduced as these systems are implemented. 
 
The FAA is currently executing a considerable transformation of the NAS called NextGen, which 
aims to improve the convenience and dependability of air travel while increasing safety and reducing 
environmental impact. NextGen plans to meet these goals by introducing a variety of new systems and 
capabilities, such as the introduction of data communications and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (FAA, 2012). NextGen ventures to improve the capacity, efficiency, and, perhaps more 
importantly, safety of the NAS through the implementation of OIs. Many operational improvements aim 
to provide controllers with decision support tools and automation specifically designed to provide safety 
enhancements to NAS operations. While NextGen may produce many positive safety improvements, the 
introduction of each new system and capability also offers the possibility of increasing the human 
contribution to risk in the NAS (Sawyer, Berry, & Blanding, 2011). This is especially true when 
considering the system-wide impact and concurrent development of many of the systems (Berry & 
Sawyer, 2012). From a risk management perspective, research into these effects is needed to address the 
potential for both positive and negative impacts on the safety of the NAS (FAA, 2011).  
The human factors community of practice has played a significant role in the enhancement of 
safety in the aviation and air traffic control (ATC) domains. However, in terms of traditional safety 
assessments, many of the tools and techniques utilized by human factors practitioners are often 
retrospective in nature. These techniques and tools serve as aids in the analysis of incident and accident 
data gathered post-hoc. While these tools and techniques have been and are still valuable in assessing the 
safety of the NAS, these tools and techniques are limited in regards to analysis of future systems, such as 
NextGen (GAO, 2011; FAA, 2011). The ability to proactively identify potential hazards to human 
performance associated with a new system before the new system is introduced into the NAS has long 
been identified as a need (GAO, 2010; GAO, 2011). Since NextGen is introducing several new systems 
and capabilities, the integration of proactive human factors safety research into the earliest stages of 
system design and acquisition could not only reduce industry cost, but also improve system design, 
development, and implementation (EUROCONTROL & FAA, 2010). A standardized approach to 
proactively identifying and assessing human performance hazards is needed to ensure these hazards are 
identified, described, and tracked. The purpose of this proactive safety assessment is to examine the 
potential changes in the human performance risk profile of current NAS operations with NAS operations 
in specified NextGen timeframe. Furthermore, the paper will present a summary of results of NextGen 
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human performance assessments (Berry, Sawyer, & Austrian, 2012; Berry & Sawyer, 2012) in 
comparison with FAA Air Traffic Organization’s (ATO) list of top hazards in the NAS for FY2013.  
Methodology 
This analysis will focus on the Segment Bravo portion of the NextGen midterm timeframe. The 
midterm and Segment Bravo are comprised of seven solution sets represents changes planned to be 
implemented beginning in 2015 (DOT IG, 2012). The solution sets are a compellation of related 
operational improvements grouped by overarching themes (FAA, 2013). Each solution set contains 
multiple OIs with each OI proposing a new system or capability. The comparisons in study will be made 
at the OI level.  
The Human Error and Safety Risk Analysis (HESRA) tool was utilized to perform the assessment 
of the NextGen midterm Segment Bravo OIs (FAA, 2009). Based on a traditional Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis, the HESRA tool provides a structured method for identifying potential human 
performance hazards and the associated worst credible outcome. A panel of ATC experts and human 
factors experts also estimated the severity, likelihood, and recovery potential for each potential human 
performance hazard. The FAA’s Safety Management System likelihood and severity scales (FAA, 2008) 
were utilized in order to ensure that identified hazards could be managed in the existing FAA safety 
process. The recovery rating in the HESRA methodology assesses the ability to both detect and recover 
from the presence of hazards in the system. Recovery is essential to differentiate between hazards that 
will be detected and recovered from before the effects propagate through the system and hazards that will 
have major system effects before they are identified and corrected. These values are then combined to 
calculate a Risk Priority Number, which can be used to compare the relative risk associated with 
identified potential human performance hazard.  
The FAA’s ATO releases an annual listing of top hazards in the NAS each fiscal year (FY). The 
list is generated from extensive reviews of safety data and discussions with ATO stakeholders. The list, 
which represents the top safety hazards, aims to assist in prioritizing ATO resources in improving the 
safety of the NAS. The top five hazards list for FY2013 is provided in Table 1 (Teixeira, 2013). For this 
assessment, the FY2013 top five hazards were compared to the Segment Bravo assessment results in an 
effort to determine linkages between the two analyses. 
 
Table 1. FY13 Top Five Hazards (Teixeira, 2013) 
FY 2013 Top 5 Hazards 
Recovery 
In some cases, margins of safety are not quickly re-established after a loss of separation. 
Traffic Advisories/Safety Alerts 
Safety alerts and/or traffic advisories are not being issued when required, removing a 
safety barrier and increasing risk. 
Failure to Monitor Initial Departure Headings 
Communications are being transferred prior to ensuring initial departure headings, 
resulting in aircraft being off frequency while controllers attempt to mitigate losses of 
separation. 
Similar Sounding Call Signs 
Aircraft are operating with similar sounding calls signs, resulting in increased 
opportunities for confusion, and incorrect aircraft receiving or reading back clearances. 
Conflicting Procedures 
Facility letters of agreement and standard operating procedures conflict with published 
arrival and/or departure procedures, increasing the likelihood for incorrect pilot 
readback and actions. 
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Results and Discussion 
Sample potential human performance hazards from the Segment Bravo human performance 
hazard assessment were identified and linked to the FY2013 top five hazards. In the following sections, 
the linkage to the top five will be discussed, and additional human performance risk hazards will be 
identified. 
FY2013 Top Five Hazards Linkage 
Table 2 outlines sample potential human performance hazards that are associated with one of the 
ATO’s top five hazards from FY2013. 
 
Table 2. FY13 Top Five Hazards Linkage 
Top 5 
Hazard OI Hazard Condition 
Potential Human 
Performance Hazard 
Worst Credible 
Outcome 
Recovery 102144 Expanded use of Automated 
Terminal Proximity Alert, 
which alerts approach 
controllers regarding 
separation problems for in-
trail aircraft on final approach, 
to include use during complex 
dependent approach operations 
involving mixed wake 
categories. 
Controller over-relies on 
automated terminal 
proximity alerting 
system and does not 
actively monitor spacing. 
Automation fails to 
display alert when 
necessary. 
Controller fails to notice 
impending loss of 
separation. Potential for 
wake turbulence 
encounter. 
Alerts 102406 Surface surveillance 
equipment is compatible with 
runway incursion indicating 
and alerting capabilities, so 
that controller and pilots 
would be warned if a ground 
vehicle enters an active 
runway, in a manner similar to 
that for an intruding aircraft. 
Controller fails to notice 
alert regarding 
unauthorized ground 
vehicle entering an 
active runway due to 
alert salience. 
Ground vehicle enters 
active runway. Potential 
for runway incursion 
between aircraft and 
ground vehicle. 
Heading 102114 Monitor aircraft conformance 
and provide an alert on the 
Radar Console when an 
aircraft’s track or position 
information indicates that the 
aircraft is laterally deviating 
from its assigned route. 
Controller fails to notice 
alert regarding aircraft 
laterally deviating from 
its assigned route. 
Aircraft continue on 
present trajectories until 
controller resolves issue 
or short term conflict alert 
activates. 
Call Signs 104207 Initial D-TAXI service will be 
the principle communication 
of taxi-out instructions via 
data communications instead 
of voice, from ground 
controllers in the ATC tower 
to flight crews as their 
departing flights enter the 
movement area of the airport 
surface and head to their 
assigned runway. 
Controller sends taxi 
instruction to incorrect 
aircraft due to mis-read 
of call signs. Taxi route 
is inadequate for aircraft 
characteristics. 
Aircraft taxis via 
inadequate taxiway 
instruction. Potential for 
taxiway incursion. 
Controller re-routes 
aircraft to correct 
destination. Potential for 
ground delays. 
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Top 5 Potential Human Worst Credible 
Hazard OI Hazard Condition Performance Hazard Outcome 
Conflicting 
Procedures 
102114 Transfer of radar identification 
will be fully automatic and 
accomplished by the 
automation without any 
controller activity if the 
aircraft is problem free at the 
transfer point. 
Transfer point identified 
by automatic handoff 
automation is 
inadequate. Transfer 
point is not in agreement 
with prior letter of 
agreement. 
Aircraft automatically 
hands-off too early or too 
late to be in accordance 
with letter of agreement. 
Transferring controller 
inhibits automatic handoff 
automation and manually 
coordinated handoffs with 
receiving controller. 
 
Recovery. The top five hazard of recovery is related to the ability of a controller to issue the 
necessary instructions to safely recover from an adverse safety event, such as a loss of separation or 
airspace violation. From a human performance perspective, this action is composed of two tasks: 
detecting the presence of an adverse event, and executing a strategy to reestablish positive safety. Since 
NextGen introduces many new decision support tools and additional automation, the potential exist for 
controller’s to suffer skill degradation due to a reliance on automation. In the sample human performance 
hazard, automation may support the controller by monitoring the spacing of aircraft during final approach. 
However, the hazard exist that the automation may not be perfect and in a particular instance, many not 
identify a spacing issue. If the controller has become over-reliant on the automation over time, the 
controller may also not identify the impending conflict. While this hazard might not occur frequently, the 
recovery period and ability for the controller has been reduced due to over-reliance on automation and 
skill degradation.  This potential human performance hazard and other similar hazards should be 
mitigated by training requirements that provide recovery training to controllers by improving the 
controller’s ability to detect a problem occurring and to develop and execute a plan to correct the problem 
at hand. 
Traffic Advisories/Safety Alerts. The top five hazard of traffic advisory/safety alert centers 
around the problems associated with safety alerts not being issued by controllers to pilots when the 
operational conditions present necessitate an alarm. In many situations, controllers have more knowledge 
regarding the conditions of the airspace or airport. For example, controllers may have more detailed 
weather information or traffic information. Relaying the information to pilots is necessary for ensuring 
the safety of the NAS. Currently, controllers proactively issue traffic advisories, and NextGen aims to 
assist the controller by providing decision-support tools to assist controllers in identifying when to issue 
such advisories. In the sample human performance hazards, ground automation may monitor ground 
vehicle movement in conjunction with aircraft movement. If a ground vehicle enters or is on a trajectory 
appearing to enter an active runway, automation will provide the controller with an alert regarding the 
vehicle. If the controller does not notice the alert because the alert is not salient enough for the 
environment, the controller may remain unaware of the ground vehicle and not issue the necessary 
instructions and advisories to avoid a runway incursion. This potential human performance hazard and 
similar hazards should be mitigated by design and research requirements that ensure the automation alert 
assisting the controller in the issuance of traffic advisories is salient and convey the correct information in 
the appropriate amount of time. 
Failure to Monitor Initial Departure Headings. The top five hazard of failure to monitor initial 
departure headings is related to the controller’s task of monitoring the aircraft’s adherence to a specific 
route and, in particular, the initial departure heading. With NextGen, the usage of area navigation (RNAV) 
routes will be increased in an effort to reduce communications and improve efficiency. RNAV routes in 
conjunction with NextGen monitoring tools aim to reduce track deviations. In the sample human 
performance hazard, automation may monitor aircraft conformance to an assigned route. If the aircraft 
laterally deviates from the route, the automation may alert the controller. It is possible that a controller 
may fail to notice the track deviation alert resulting in a track deviation and potential conflict. While a 
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decision support tool may assist in identifying potential track deviations, the possibility always exists for 
the automation to be imperfect or for the controller to not perceive the automation alert. Like the previous 
hazard, the salience of the automation notification or alert should be examined. However, other mitigation 
strategies exist for this particular top five hazard. For example, prior to departure a controller can verify 
the initial departure heading or first departure fix with the pilot. A procedural mitigation strategy may be 
implemented to address the hazard during the development of the automation strategy and may support 
the automation after deployment. 
Similar Sounding Call Signs. The top five hazard of similar sounding call signs identifies the 
issue of confusion associated with call signs and hearback/readback errors. With NextGen, the usage of 
voice communications may be supplemented with the increase usage of data communications. While 
issues particular to voice communications, such as similar sounding call signs, may be reduced, new 
human factors issues particular to data communications may arise (e.g., misreading similar looking call 
signs). In the sample human performance hazard, the ground controller to may utilize data 
communications to issue pilots taxi instructions. If the controller mis-reads a call sign, the potential exist 
for the controller to send the incorrect taxi instruction to the mis-read aircraft. The aircraft could then taxi 
via an inadequate taxi route. Future research should be conducted to further examine the mis-read of data 
communications for both the controller and pilot. 
Conflicting Procedures. The tops five hazard of conflicting procedures is related to operational 
procedures not being in accordance with existing procedures or letter of agreements. NextGen operational 
improvements may implement many new procedures and systems that must interact with existing 
procedures and letter of agreements. It is important for designers to be familiar and incorporate those 
existing conditions and procedures into the NextGen capabilities. In the sample human performance 
hazard, the handoff of an aircraft’s radar identification to the bordering sector may be automated to 
reduce controller workload. Once a aircraft reaches a specific transfer point in a sector, the aircraft will 
automatically handoff to the receiving sector. However, if designers have not incorporated an existing 
letter of agreement in the determination of the transfer point, the transfer point could be incorrectly placed 
resulting in an aircraft handing-off at the in proper time or manner. If the problem of the incorrect transfer 
point continues, the transferring controller may elect to inhibit the automatic handoff feature eliminating 
the benefits associated by the automation. This human performance hazard and similar hazards should be 
mitigated by developing design requirements for the incorporation of existing procedures and letter of 
agreements into new systems. 
NextGen Human Performance Assessment 
The ATO’s top five hazards are associated with many of the NextGen human performance 
assessment hazards. Furthermore, the NextGen human performance assessment identified many other 
potential risks. For more detail information on portions of the NextGen human performance assessment 
please see Berry and Sawyer (2012), Berry, Sawyer, and Austrian (2012), and Sawyer, Berry, and 
Austrian (2012). These assessments and the overall assessment identified many human performance 
hazards associated with Segment Bravo, and also developed design, training, and research requirements 
targeted to mitigate or eliminate the impact of those hazards. The overall findings included human 
performance issues associated with data communications on the ground, enhanced vision systems for 
pilots, integrated en route display systems, inter-relationships of automated systems, and proposed alerts 
and notifications. 
To expand on one of the human performance findings identified by the overall assessment, the 
findings presented by Sawyer, Berry, and Austrian (2012) revealed that many new alerts and notifications 
could potentially be implemented into the NAS in the NextGen midterm. Whereas current air traffic 
controllers have two primary safety-critical alerts, the conflict alert and minimum safe altitude warning, 
controllers in the midterm could have an additional nine alerts or notifications related to the 
implementation of new procedures with reduced separation standards. As each of these alerts is developed 
and implemented, a series of research studies will be needed to determine the proper implementation 
strategy and to determine if the potential for over-burdening the controller with too many alerts and too 
169
 
much information exist. These efforts should focus on determining the necessary mode, salience, location, 
required level of accuracy, and place in the greater air traffic alert hierarchy for each alert.  
Conclusions 
In an effort to improve the efficiency and safety of the NAS, NextGen introduces new automation 
and capabilities in the form of operational improvements. While these changes may indeed produce 
positive safety improvements, the introduction of each new system and capability also offers the 
possibility of introducing new human performance hazards into the NAS. A thorough review of the 
proposed NextGen midterm Segment Bravo was completed to identify the potential for both the positive 
and negative impacts on the human contribution to risk in the NAS. A summary of these findings was 
presented by linking the proactive human performance assessment with the ATO’s top five hazards in the 
NAS for fiscal year 2013. The results showed that while some of the human performance hazards present 
in current operations were reduced or eliminated, many new human performance hazards could also be 
introduced as these systems are implemented. 
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